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INTRODUCTION
What do you think about same-sex marriage? Ask a group of
friends this question and you will quickly realize that there are few
fence-sitters regarding this issue-you are either for it or against it.
Few questions stir such heated debate, and why not? The issue of
same-sex marriage and its ultimate acceptance or rejection will have a
profound effect on our society as we know it. Add to the discussion
of same-sex marriage the "dismal swamp"' of conflict of laws, and the
debate becomes explosive.
A conflict of laws arises when a transaction or occurrence that is
the subject of a cause of action has contacts with more than one state
or country; as the laws of every forum differ, the determination of
which law shall apply to a particular cause of action often has a direct
and profound effect on the outcome of the case.2 In a conflict of laws
situation, granting comity to a foreign state's laws instead of applying
the law of the forum results in ajudgment that would not be possible
if the forum were ruling on a purely domestic case.
In the context of same-sex marriage, such a conflict would arise if a
same-sex couple legally married pursuant to one state's laws were to
move to another state and file a cause of action to have their same-
sex marriage recognized. The forum state would need to decide
whether to apply its own laws, which presumably might not recognize
same-sex marriage, or to grant comity to the laws of the state where
the marriage was celebrated. If the forum state applies its own laws,
the case would be dismissed; if the forum applies the laws of the state
of celebration, however, the union would be recognized. Thus, the
decision of which law to apply considerably affects the outcome of
the case.
To date, numerous law review articles have lauded the legal recog-
nition of same-sex marriage, proffering that the correct application
1. See William Posner, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953)
(characterizing as a "dismal swamp" the difficulties lawyers and courts encounter when faced
with questions concerning conflicts of law).
2. See generally ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS v (5th ed. 1993).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 752-818 (1995) (citing economic incentives
to recognizing same-sex marriages, such as increased tourism); Robert L. Cordell, II, Same-Sex
Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 247, 257 (1994) (citing history of societies
allowing same-sex marriage); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slum-
bering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 921, 936-84 (1995) (discussing Equal Protection and Due Process issues implicated by
refusing to recognize same-sex marriage); Anne M. Burton, Note, Gay Marriage-A Modern Pro-
posal. ApplyingBaehr v. Lewin to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 IND.J.
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of conflict of laws rules all but ensures that once one state recognizes
same-sex marriage, other states will be required to recognize out-of-
state same-sex marriages! Without taking a position on the propriety
of same-sex marriage, this Comment, contends that states could refuse
to recognize such unions through legitimate application of conflict
of laws rules. Part It of this Comment discusses the recent Hawaii
state court decision in Baehr v. Miike,5 in which the Hawaii Circuit
Court held that the Hawaii state constitution guarantees the right of
same-sex couples to marry. Next, Part III discusses the regulation of
marriage as a sovereign power of individual states. Part IV argues
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not solve the question of
interstate validation of same-sex marriages and that states must there-
fore turn to a conflict of laws analysis to determine recognition of
such unions. Finally, Part V illustrates how the legitimate application
of existing conflict of laws rules could lead states to refuse to recog-
nize same-sex marriages performed in other states.
I. BAEHR V. M/IKE
Pending litigation in Hawaii has brought the issues of same-sex
marriage and conflict of laws to the forefront. Depending on the
Hawaii court's ultimate decision in Baehr v. Miike,6 state courts and
legislatures across the country may be forced to address the issue of
same-sex marriage and the impact that Hawaii's law addressing such
unions could have on other states.7
GLoBAL LEG. STUD. 177, 198-206 (1995) (looking to international human rights instruments to
secure basic rights, including the right to marry, for gay Americans). But see Lynn D. Wardle, A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 26-62 (stating
that there is no constitutional right to same-sex marriage, that the nature and meaning of mar-
riage is exclusively heterosexual, that history does not support same-sex marriage, and that
there is no societal consensus for extending the right to marry to same-sex couples).
4. See Cordell, supra note 3, at 264-71 (concluding that out-of-state same-sex marriages
should be valid in forum state as long as parties did not lack mental capacity and were old
enough at time marriage was performed); Note, In Sickness and In Health, In Hawaii and Where
Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARv. L. REv. 2038, 2041 (1996)
(arguing that lex Loc celebrationis should govern recognition of same-sex marriage, thus leading a
forum to recognize same-sex marriages performed in foreign state); Anthony Dominic
D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 911, 941-43 (concluding that after applying conflict of laws rules and policy argu-
ments, states should recognize certain same sex marriages performed outside the forum); cf.
Habib A. Balian, Note, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital Status, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 397, 401 (1995) (arguing that Full Faith and Credit Clause may require states to
recognize same-sex marriages performed pursuant to other state's laws).
5. No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
6. Baehrv. Lewin, 91-1394-05 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991),vacated, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993), reh'g sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
7. See, e.g., James Kunen, Hawaiian Courtship; Gay Marriage May Become Legal in the Is-
lands-Without Necessarily Coming to a Chapel Near You, TIME, Dec. 16, 1996, at 44 (discussing De-
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In Baehr, three same-sex couples filed suit against the Director of
the Hawaii Department of Health8 for refusing to issue marriage li-
censes to the couples solely on the ground that the couples were of
the same sex.9 The plaintiffs alleged that the Hawaii marriage license
law1 was unconstitutional because it discriminated against same-sex
couples on the basis of gender." In 1991, the Hawaii Circuit Court
granted the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dis-
missal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 2 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal in October, 1991.'"
fense of Marriage Act, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and recognition of Hawaiian same-sex
marriages by courts in other states); Mike McKee, Gay Marriages Face Serious Obstacles, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PAPERS File (citing ef-
forts by sixteen states to bar recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages); Todd D. Ro-
bichaud, Defense of Marriage-Or Attack on Family?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A24 (discussing
Defense of Marriage Act and state efforts to pass legislation barring recognition of same-sex
marriages performed in other states); Victoria Slind-Flor, Same-Sex Case Poses Many Questions,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A8 (citing Defense of Marriage Act and sixteen states' new laws re-
fusing to recognize same-sex marriages solemnized in other states); Andrew Sullivan, Hawaii
Aye-Nearing the Altar on Gay Marriages, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1996, at 15 (citing state
efforts to pass legislation barring recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages).
8. At the time the original cause of action was filed, the Hawaii Director of Health was
John C. Lewin. Director Lewin was succeeded by Lawrence H. Miike while this case was still
pending. Director Miike's name was automatically substituted for former-Director Lewin.
9. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48-49 (Haw. 1993).
10. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985) (amended 1994). The Hawaii marriage license
statute specifically referred to applicants for a marriage license in terms of one party being
male and the other being female. See id. Section 572-1 provides that to make a marriage con-
tract valid, it is necessary that:
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each other of ancestor and
descendant of any degree whatsoever, brother and sister of the half as well as to
the whole blood, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, whether the relationship is
legitimate or illegitimate;
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful wife living and that the woman does
not at the time have any lawful husband living;
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the State by a person or society with a
valid license to solemnize marriages and the man and woman to be married and
the person performing the marriage ceremony be all physically present at the
same place and time for the marriage ceremony.
Id. (emphasis added); see HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1994). Pursuant to Chapter 217, § 3, Ha-
waii's Laws of 1994, HRS § 572-1 was amended to clarify that a valid marriage contract shall
only be between a man and a woman. Because this new section also classifies parties to a valid
marriage contract by gender, its provisions are subject to the Hawaii Circuit Court's ruling in
Baehr. The Hawaii legislature, in enacting the amendment to this section provided a lengthy
legislative finding, stating that the decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples should not
be done by the Judiciary. The legislature argues that this expansion of the definition of mar-
riage should only be undertaken by the people, through a constitutional amendment, or by
their duly elected representatives to the state legislature. The legislative findings and purpose
also criticized the court in Baehr by stating that the plurality decision failed to afford sufficient
weight to the strong presumption that every statute is unconstitutional.
11. See id. (referring to parties to a marriage contract as "man" and "woman," "brother"
and "sister," "uncle" and "niece," and "aunt" and "nephew").
12. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48. The circuit court held that Lewin was"'entitled tojudgement
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On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court in its plurality opinion held
that the circuit court's judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law
was erroneously granted.14 The Hawaii Supreme Court further rec-
ognized that while there is a fundamental right to marriage," there is
no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Hawaii Consti-
tution.' Unlike the circuit court, however, the Hawaii Supreme
Court did not find that the plaintiffs were without any potential rem-
edy. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the couples were entitled
to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the Hawaii marriage license
statute comports with the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Con-
stitution, which is broader than the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. 7
Because the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause specifi-
cally states that a person cannot be denied the equal protection of
in his favor as a matter of law'" and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. See id.
13. See Baehr v. Lewin, No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *2 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
14. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52-54 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court held
that the circuit court made evidentiary findings of fact without the benefit of having any eviden-
tiary record before it. See id. at 53.
15. See id. at 55. The court in Baehr held that article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution
encompasses all of the fundamental rights recognized under the United States Constitution,
including the United States Supreme Court's holding that the right to marry is a fundamental
right. See id. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme Court first recognized
marriage as a fundamental right by linking the right to marriage to the right to procreate, be-
cause "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." Id. at 541; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness. . . ."). In rejecting Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the Court in Loving stressed
that the right to marry is "one of the 'basic civil rights of [men and women].'" Id. (quoting
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); O'Neill v. Dent,
364 F. Supp. 565, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[T]he right to marry underlies the purposes of the
Constitution, although not mentioned therein, and is a fundamental right afforded protection
by the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.").
16. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57. In holding that the Hawaii Constitution does not recognize a
fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry, the court stated:
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions
and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and po-
litical institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty norjustice would exist if it
were sacrificed. Accordingly, we hold that the applicant couples do not have a fun-
damental constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out of the right to privacy
or otherwise.
Id. at 48.
17. See id. The court held that the applicant couples were "free to press their equal pro-
tection claim." Id. The equal protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution is broader
than the similar clause contained in the United States Constitution. Compare HAW. CONST. ART.
I, § 5 (stating that"[n]o person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be de-
nied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry"), with U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 (stating
that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws").
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the laws because of their sex," the court rejected application of the
"rational basis" test'9 or "intermediate scrutiny'20 to determine the
constitutionality of the Hawaii marriage license statute. The Hawaii
Supreme Court concluded that "sex is a 'suspect category' for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the
Hawaii Constitution and that HRS § 572-1 is subject to the 'strict
scrutiny' test.",2' Under strict scrutiny, the court presumes the chal-
leged statute to be unconstitutional unless the state can prove that
the suspect category is 'Justified by compelling state interests
and.., the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridg-
ments of the applicant couples' constitutional rights. 2 The case was
remanded to the Hawaii Circuit Court for further proceedings to de-
termine if the State could show a compelling state interest for refus-
ing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.23
In December, 1996, the Hawaii Circuit Court held that the State
had failed to show a compelling state interest for the sex-based classi-
fication of HRS § 572-1, and further failed to establish that HRS §
572-1 is narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgments of consti-
tutional rights. 24 The State of Hawaii immediately appealed the rul-
ing and Circuit Court Judge Chang stayed his ruling pending ap-
peal.25 Following the Hawaii Circuit Court's decision, the state
legislature in 1997 passed a resolution to allow the Hawaiian elector-
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the respectively broader and nar-
rower Equal Protection Clauses of the Hawaii State Constitution and the United States Consti-
tution).
19. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63-64 (stating that the first step in determining whether a statute
violates the State's equal protection clause is to determine whether the statute should be sub-
jected to "strict scrutiny" or a "rational basis test" (citing Nagle v. Board of Ed., 629 P.2d 109,
111 (Haw. 1981))). A statute will be subject to the rational basis test provided that
"fundamental rights" or a "suspect" classification is not at issue. See id. at 64 ("'Under the ra-
tional basis test, we inquire as to whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state inter-
est.'" (quoting Estate of Coates v. Pacific Eng'g, 791 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Haw. 1990))).
20. See id. at 65-66 (noting that the Hawaii courts have already "unequivocally established,
for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Constitution, that sex-based classifi-
cations are subject, as a per se matter, to some form of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it 'strict' or
'intermediate,' rather than mere 'rational basis' analysis." (citing Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d
1164, 1167 (Haw. 1978))). The United States Supreme Court has held that sex-based classifica-
tions are subject to "intermediate scrutiny" under the U.S. Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important government objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
21. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 68. In order to meet strict scrutiny, "the burden will rest on Lewin to over-
come the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitu-
tional rights." Id.




ate to amend the Hawaii state constitution and ban same-sex mar-
riage in the state.26 In light of this proposed constitutional amend-
ment, the state asked the Hawaii Supreme Court to wait until after
Election Day 1998 to rule on the state's appeal to the Circuit Court's
ruling in Baehr 1
7
If the Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately determines that the mar-
riage license statute is unconstitutional and recognizes same-sex mar-
riages, proponents of same-sex marriage insist that other states must
recognize such marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or
alternatively that conflict of laws rules should be invoked to expand
same-sex marriage beyond the boundaries of the sovereign State of
Hawaii.28  Although requirements for marriage within a particular
state traditionally have been governed by the laws of that state,2 in
most instances, marriages performed in one state are presumed to be
valid in all other states even if the marriage does not comport with
the marriage requirements of the forum state.3 ' There are significant
exceptions to this general rule, however, and the issue of same-sex
marriage will ultimately test the boundaries of this presumption of
validity."
II. REGULATION OF MARRIAGE IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STATES
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. 3 2 The United States Constitution does
not grant the federal government the right to regulate marriage.
Thus, this right has long been recognized as a sovereign right of the
individual states.3 The court in Baehr recognized that
26. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Few Opt for Hawaii Unmarried Couple Benefits, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1998, at A2; see also H.R. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997).
27. See Gay Rights, THE LAWYER, Sept. 16, 1997, at 13; Cheryl Wetzstein, Marriage Debate
Heats Up in Hawaii, WASH. TIMEsJuly 21, 1997, at AS.
28. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (arguing for legalization of same-sex mar-
riages and interstate recognition of such marriages).
29. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 58 ("The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function re-
served exclusively to the respective states."); see also infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text
(discussing sovereignty of states in deciding marriage requirements and the traditional treat-
ment of marriage).
30. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the "presumption of validity"
of marriages performed outside the forum state).
31. See infra Part V (discussing exceptions to general rule of validation of out-of-state mar-
riages).
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
33. SeeWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) ("Within the limits of her po-
litical power [a state] may, of course, enforce her own policy regarding the marriage relation-
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[b]y its very nature, the power to regulate the marriage relation in-
cludes the power to determine the requisites of a valid marriage
contract and to control the qualifications of the contracting parties,
the forms and procedures necessary to solemnize the marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effect upon property and other
rights, and the grounds for marital dissolution.
Although the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")35
signified the federal government's rejection of same-sex marriages
under federal law 6 and prohibited any requirement compelling a
state to validate same-sex marriages performed in another state, 7 the
power to determine who may enjoy the marital relationship in a par-
ticular state remains a sovereign power of the individual states.38 Al-
though this Comment does not fully explore the constitutionality of
an institution more basic in our civilization than any other."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (explaining that marriage and procreation are within "the scope of the police
power of the States"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (holding that marriage is a so-
cial relation subject to states' police power); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Nev.
1980) (stating that the power to regulate marriage has not been granted to the federal gov-
ernment, but rather is a sovereign function retained by the states); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F.
Supp. 565, 569 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("(Slubject to constitutional limitations, the legislatures of
the States are authorized to regulate the qualifications of the contracting parties, the forms or
procedures necessary to solemnize the marriage, the various duties and obligations which it
creates, and the procedures for dissolution."). Among other things, state legislatures may con-
trol the qualifications of the contracting parties, forms or procedures necessary to solemnize
the marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, the effect upon property rights, and the
grounds for dissolution. See Salisbury, 501 F. Supp. at 107.
34. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48.
35. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.) 2419
(1996).
36. See id. § 3. The Defense of Marriage Act clarifies that for the purpose of federal law,
marriage does not encompass same-sex marriage:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Id. Consequently, even if Hawaii were to recognize same sex marriages, and even if those mar-
riages were recognized by some states, these same-sex marriages would not be valid for federal
purposes-for example, for federal income tax status.
37. The Defense of Marriage Act provides in part that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe, shall be re-
quired to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same-sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id. § 2(a).
38. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 158 (1996) (statement of Professor Lynn D.
Wardle) (stating that DOMA does not interfere with ability of states to define and regulate
marriage for themselves); The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm.
On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 23 (1996) (written statement of Professor Lynn D. Wardle)
(stating that DOMA takes neutral position on interstate recognition of same-sex marriages and
leaves states' powers to regulate marriage intact).
1997] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
DOMA, the reader should be aware that the ability of this statute to
pass constitutional muster is hotly contested.39
In response to the potential consequences of Baehr, many states
have either passed laws or are considering legislation to bar recogni-
tion of out-of-state same-sex marriages.0
III. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE DOES NOT RESOLVE THE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE VALIDATION QUESTION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the pub-
lic Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."' Proponents of interstate recognition of same-sex marriage
assert that this language requires states to give full faith and credit to
such marriages performed in other states.42
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not, however, require the
interstate recognition of same-sex marriages. Pursuant to federal
law43 and judicial interpretation, 44 the Full Faith and Credit Clause
has traditionally been recognized as requiring states to give full faith
and credit to other states' court judgments; however, the Supreme
Court has distinguished public acts and conflicting statutes, "'the ex-
trastate effect of which Congress has not prescribed,"' acknowledging
39. SeeAnna Snider, Forum on Same-Sex Marriage Forebodes Statehuse Debate, NJ. LJ., Apr. 14,
1997, at 1 (stating that opponents of DOMA claim that Congress does not have the power to
cancel out the Full Faith and Credit Clause, while proponents of the law argue that Congress
has plenary authority to define the Full Faith and Credit Clause); cf. Balian, supra note 4, at 408
(arguing that marital decrees fall within ambit of Full Faith and Credit Clause).
40. See David W. Dunlap, Fearing a Toehold for Gay Marriages, Conservatives Rush to Bar the
Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A13 (citing state efforts to pass legislation rejecting same-sex
marriage). Utah and South Dakota have already passed such legislation, while at least twenty
other states, including California, Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are considering legislation to ban same-sex
marriage. See id.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
42. See Balian, supra note 4, at 408-10.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1994) ("[J]udgments shall have such faith and credit given to
them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
State from which they are taken.").
44. See Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818).
[T]he judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in
every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pro-
nounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and
none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United States.
Id.; see also Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 230 (1908) (holding that ifjudgment of one state is
final, it cannot be impeached either in or out of state by showing it was based on mistake of
law).
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that "'some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two
states is necessary."""
With regard to the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on
recognition of another state's laws, the Court held that:
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, be-
cause of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by
the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing,
upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved
those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.4
Thus, conflicting state laws have been subject to a balancing of
state interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, while judg-
ments have been automatically enforced. Under the newly enacted
Defense of Marriage Act, however, Congress has prescribed the ex-
trastate effect of the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of a
state relative to same-sex marriages.47 Thus, for the purpose of same-
sex marriages, Congress has decreed that neither the public acts or
records, nor the judicial proceedings of a state must be afforded per
se validity under a Full Faith and Credit analysis.48
Prior to the enactment of DOMA, same-sex couples could circum-
vent a state statute that refused to recognize their out-of-state same-
sex marriage by obtaining a declaratory judgment in the state where
the marriage was performed;49 declaratory judgments are typically
considered final judgments for purposes of Full Faith and Credit
analysis. 0 DOMA, however, limits the effect of a state's judicial pro-
ceedings with regard to extending Full Faith and Credit to same sex
marriages.5' Pursuant to DOMA, a state can refuse to recognize a
same-sex marriage performed in another state, even if the couple ob-
tained a declaratory judgment in the state where the marriage was
performed.
Should a forum state refuse to grant Full Faith and Credit to an
out-of-state same-sex marriage, the forum could then turn to a con-
flict of laws analysis to determine the validity of the marriage in ques-
45. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942) (quoting Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)).
46. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547-48.
47. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing Defense of Marriage Act).
48. See id.
49. See Balian, supra note 4, at 426 (stating that marital decrees would be considered a
judgment for Full Faith and Credit purposes and would, therefore, be automatically enforce-
able by other states).
50. See CRAMTON Lr AL., supra note 2, at 454 (noting that declaratoryjudgments fall within
parameters of Full Faith and Credit Clause and are conclusive as to matters declared).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
1997] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
tion. Under existing conflict of laws rules, the forum could refuse to
recognize the marriage.
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS ANALYSIS COULD LEAD STATES TO INVALIDATE
OUT-OF-STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
A. Lex Loci Celebrationis: The General Rule of Validation
In the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, lex loci celebrationis,
which is the traditional conflict of laws rule for validity of marriages,
provides that states should rely on the law of the state in which the
marriage was celebrated to determine its validity. 2  Under this
"general rule of validation, 53 marriages performed in one state will
be recognized in the forum state as long as the marriage was valid
under the laws of the state where it was celebrated.54
Although marriages performed out-of-state enjoy a presumption of
validity, this general rule of validation is not absolute.5 Courts have
taken exception when marriages are accompanied by certain circum-
stances, including incest,-
6 violation of minimum age requirements,
5 7
remarriage," and polygamy.
52. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
53. Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450, 454-55 (1994) (explaining rule
and analyzing traditional and modem choice of law doctrine support for rule).
54. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 121; see also ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAws 138 (1962) ("Current doctrine and court language assume a
'governing' law of the place of celebration."); ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS
OF LAW § 220 (1986) (discussing the lex loci celebrationis choice of law rule for interstate valida-
tion of marriage); RUSSELLWEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLIG OF LAWS § 5.1A (3d ed.
1986) (summarizing the traditional rule of the place of celebration for determining the validity
of a marriage performed outside the forum state); Hovermill, supra note 53, at 453-55
(discussing choice of law rule as applied by state courts).
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (outlining exceptions to general rule of
validation).
56. See Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577, 581 (Ala. 1938) (refusing to recognize an out-of-
state marriage that violated Alabama's statute prohibiting incestuous marriages); Catalano v.
Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (holding that marriage performed in another
state was violative of Connecticut marriage law prohibiting incestuous marriages and was,
therefore, invalid in Connecticut).
57. See Smith v. Smith, 11 S.E. 496, 498-99 (Ga. 1890) (refusing to validate out-of-state mar-
riage that violated Georgia's minimum age requirement for marriage); Wilkins v. Zelichowski,
140 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. 1958) (finding marriage violating NewJersey's age requirement was not
valid in the forum state even though valid in the state of celebration).
58. Many of the decisions invalidating out-of-state marriages of divorced persons are older,
though still significant. SeeWilson v. Cook, 100 N.E. 222, 223-24 (Ill. 1912) (invalidating out-of-
state marriage performed within one year of divorce decree); In re Estate of Rogers, 569 P.2d
536, 538 (Okla. 1977) (stating that out-of-state marriage is voidable if it occurs within six
months after divorce); Knoll v. Knoll, 176 P. 22, 23 (Wash. 1918) (holding foreign marriage
void if within six months of divorce).
59. Courts have consistently invalidated polygamous marriages. See EUGENE F. SCOLES &
PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.18 (2d ed. 1992). See generallyWEINTRAUB, supra note 54, §
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The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws generally follows
the rule of validation, 60 though the forum may apply its own laws if it
determines that it is the state with the "most significant relationship"
to the spouses and the marriagei' This approach is discussed in
greater detail in Part IV.B.62
Supporters of interstate recognition of same-sex marriage argue
that under this general rule of validation, a forum state would be
forced to recognize the same-sex marriages performed in other states
under either the traditional lex loci celebrationis rule or the Second Re-
statement's most significant relationship approach."' The general
rule of validation has noteworthy escape devices, however, that could
lead a forum state to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages.
1. Marriage evasion statutes
The first exception to the traditional rule of validation recognizes a
forum state's right to enact clear statutory language expressing that
the otherwise applicable conflict of laws rules do not apply to certain
types of marriages, and that such marriages performed in other states
will not be recognized by the forum.6' Both the first and second Re-
5.1A (discussing cases in which courts have invalidated out-of-state marriages for being violative
of the forum state's marriage requirements).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] (outlining Second Restatement most significant relationship ap-
proach and § 6 factors); Hovermill, supra note 53, at 454-55 (discussing the general rule of vali-
dation).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 283(1) ("The validity of a marriage will be determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage . .. ."). Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) out-
lines numerous factors to consider in determining the place of the most significant relation-
ship. Under section 6(1), courts should first look to any statutory directive on choice of law for
the issue in question. See id. § 6(1). If the forum has no such directive, several other factors
should be considered by a state in determining the applicable rule of law, including:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
62. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text (discussing the most significant relation-
ship approach).
63. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing law review articles arguing that same-
sex marriages performed in other states must be recognized by forum).
64. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 54, § 5.1A (discussing such statutes and decisions of courts
interpreting them). The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, 9 U.LA. 480 (1942), was an example
of one such statute. This statute provided that when domiciliaries of a state that prohibited
their marriage traveled to another state to marry, their marriage was void and would not be
recognized by the state where the parties were domiciled. The states that adopted this or simi-
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statements recognize a state's power to enact such statutes.65
Such marriage evasion statutes are present in only a minority of
states;" as discussed above, however, proposed legislation banning
recognition of same-sex marriage is on the rise.67 Given these legisla-
tive efforts to ban recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, this
exception to the general rule of validation may become more signifi-
cant than it traditionally has been.'
2. The public policy exception
The second, more widely invoked exception to the general rule of
validation of out-of-state marriages is that based on public policy, an
exception recognized in both the first and second Restatements.'
The public policy exception" under the traditional rules precludes
suits "upon a cause of action created in another state the enforce-
lar marriage evasion statutes, are prohibited from entertaining causes of action seeking recog-
nition of marriages that fall within the purview of the statute. See Hovermill, supra note 53, at
455-56.
65. SeeRESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 132. Section 132 provides in part:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the
requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be
invalid everywhere in the following cases:
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even though
celebrated in another state.
Id. Comment e of § 132 indicates that such marriage evasion statutes do not necessarily need
to be narrowly drawn to have effect. This comment provides in part that such a statute may
provide in specific words or be so interpreted that if parties domiciled in a state and intending
to continue to be domiciled there, go to another state in order to circumvent the law of the
domicile, "such marriage shall be ... void for all purposes in the state of the domicil." Id. § 132
cmt. e; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 6(1) ("A court, subject to constitutional
restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.").
66. See Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-Traditional Family: The
Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L. REV.
809, 813 n.9 (1992) (discussing marriage evasion statutes generally and listing thirteen states
that have such statutes, including Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois,
Maine, Massachussetts, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).
67. In response to concerns about possible recognition of same-sex marriage in other
states, this year state legislators in thirty states introduced legislation to ban recognition of
same-sex marriages within the boundaries of those thirty states. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text (reporting political hostility toward same-sex marriage).
68. See. Hovermill, supra note 53, at 493 nn.34-37 (noting that Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act, 9 U.LA 480 (1942), was adopted by only five states before it was withdrawn from list of
recommended Uniform Acts in 1943).
69. SeemRsATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 60, § 90 (recognizing public policy exception);
REsTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 612 (precluding suits "upon a cause of action created in an-
other state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum").
70. See Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Va. 1939) ("[A] mar-
riage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere... [except those m]arriages deemed contrary
to the laws of nature ... [and] marriages positively forbidden by statute because contrary to
local public policy.").
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ment of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.'
At first blush, this exception appears to have the potential to swallow
the rule of validation. It has not done so, however, because courts
have narrowly construed the term public policy.7 The fact that the
forum state's laws are different from the laws of the place of celebra-
tion, or that the forum has simply not legislated on the matter, does
not alone justify invocation of the exception. 73 Traditionally, courts
have only invoked the public policy exception in cases where the
other state's law violates the forum state's strong public policy.74 Judge
Cardozo provided now famous commentary on the test for issues se-
rious enough to invoke the public policy exception:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency
or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.7'
With regard to same-sex marriage, a forum state's courts would
first assess the public policy supporting the state's marriage statutes.76
A statute containing express language invalidating same-sex mar-
riage77 and explicitly stating that such invalidation applies to mar-
71. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52,§ 612.
72. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing various circumstances under
which courts have invalidated marriages in part based on public policy grounds).
73. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 608 (Md. 1985) ("We
fully agree that merely because Maryland law is dissimilar to the law of another jurisdiction
does not render the latter contrary to Maryland public policy and thus unenforceable in our
courts."); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918) ("Our own scheme of legis-
lation may be different. We may even have no legislation on the subject. That is not enough to
show that the public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign right."); Robertson v. Estate of
McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. 1980) ("Although the policies of Texas and New Mexico
differ... that does not mean that the New Mexico rule is so contrary to our public policy that
our courts will refuse to enforce it.").
74. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 54, § 45 (discussing strong public policy basis for refusing
to hear foreign actions).
75. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202.
76. See Miller v. American Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (W.D. Ark. 1954) (finding that
state statute prohibiting certain arbitration provisions was sufficient to state the forum's public
policy on domestic contracts, but was not dispositive of the forum's policy toward out-of-state
contracts); Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 1986) (stating that in order to
invoke the public policy exception, the forum's law must expressly state an intention to void
foreign laws that are ordinarily applied under the traditional conflict of laws rule).
77. A state's intent to invalidate same-sex marriages within the state may be insufficient to
ensure that the forum's courts will invalidate such marriages performed outside the forum. See
Johnson v. Lincoln Square Props., Inc., 571 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing out-of-state common law marriages even though state law declared such marriages
void); In re Estate of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156, 158-61 (Kan. 1981) (validating out-of-state
marriage of first cousins despite Kansas statute declaring such marriages void); Leszinske v.
Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (validating foreign marriage between uncle
and niece despite state law declaring such marriages absolutely void); In re May's Estate, 114
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953) (recognizing out-of-state marriage between niece and uncle, even
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riages celebrated both in and out of state would be indicative of a
policy strong enough to invoke the exception.7 8
It may be unnecessary, however, for statutes to be so specific in or-
der to be a strong indicator of public policy. Courts have inferred
public policy from weaker indications of statutory intent," and the
second Restatement advises that the forum "apply its own legal prin-
ciples to determine whether a given policy is a strong one....""
Thus, courts that are willing to infer intent may be able to find a
strong public policy based on statutory language even if the legisla-
tive history or intent does not expressly address the subject of out-of-
state same-sex marriage.1
Courts may also look to the history and traditions of the forum and
society generally for indications of public policy regarding same-sex
marriages. While some commentators have argued that our society
has a long history of same-sex marriage, the examples cited are spo-
radic at best and have never included state-sanctioned same-sex mar-
riages. 82 Such examples are so infrequent that they provide little
support for claims that American society has a long history of same-
sex marriage and patently ignore the centuries-long history of het-
erosexual marriage in American culture. This history and tradition is
often clearly depicted in the caselaw of a forum, providing additional
though state law considered such marriages "incestuous and absolutely void").
78. Some courts have validated out-of-state marriages if the statute declaring such mar-
riages as void articulates a specific intention to apply such prohibitions to out-of-state mar-
riages. See State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ark. 1957) ("The intent must find clear and
unmistakable expression."); Allen v. Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (noting
that statute did not expressly address invalidation of out-of-state marriages); Loughmiller, 629
P.2d at 158 (requiring that statute contain express language in order to void valid out-of-state
marriage); May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 6 (noting that statute did not expressly regulate out-of-
state marriages).
79. Se Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 1961) (finding prohibitions in
marriage statute and criminalization of incestuous marriages sufficient to invalidate out-of-state
marriages); Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. 1979) (finding valid
out-of-state common law marriage void for public policy based on forum law invalidating such
marriages); Stein v. Stein, 641 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. CL App. 1982) (holding that state law in-
validating common law marriages was sufficient to void valid out-of-state common law mar-
riages).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 283 cmt. k.
81. See Osoniach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577, 580 (Ala. 1938) (finding marriage void for public
policy where forum's statute did not allow incestuous marriages, even though statute had no
statement specifically voiding such marriages performed in other states); Catalano, 170 A.2d at
728-29 (inferring intent to invalidate out-of-state incestuous marriage from statute invalidating
all such marriages within forum); Laikola, 277 N.W.2d at 656; Stein, 641 S.W.2d at 857 (inferring
intent to void out-of-state common law marriages from statutes prohibiting such marriages in
the forum).
82. Se Cordell, supra note 3, at 260-61 (citing the late nineteenth century same-sex union
of a key figure in the Zuni (Native American) community and the practice of"passing" whereby
women have dressed in men's clothes and passed as men, and also describing flourishing les-
bian subculture in Harlem in 1920s, including large wedding ceremonies, replete with brides-
maids and attendants).
1997]
180 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:165
evidence of the forum's public policy regarding same-sex marriage.
For example, a state court might have held prior to statutory enact-
ment that such forum does not recognize same-sex marriage, s or
simply defined marriage as being between a man and a woman.84
Looking beyond the forum's caselaw, the institution of marriage,
which is repeatedly protected by the Supreme Court, has never in-
cluded homosexual relations and consistently is defined by the Court
as an act between a man and a woman.85 Moreover, federal and state
courts considering the issue of same-sex marriage consistently have
held that, by definition, marriage does not include the union of
members of the same sex.86
The existence of sodomy statutes in the forum state provides addi-
tional evidence of a state's public policy against homosexual relation-
ships. Courts understandably could infer from such statutes that a
83. See Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (1996) (concluding that New York does
not recognize or authorize same-sex marriage).
84. See id. at 287 ("The long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male and
female, testifies to a contrary political, cultural, religious and legal consensus.");In re Estate of
Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) ("The institution of marriage as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and, rearing of children within a family, is
as old as the book of Genesis." (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)));see also
infra note 86 and accompanying text (listing numerous cases where federal and state courts
have held that marriage does not encompass same-sex marriage).
85. SeeWardle, supra note 3, at 32-38 (citing numerous Supreme Court decisions protect-
ing heterosexual marriage, including Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Poe v. Ulman, 367
U.S. 497 (1961)).
86. See id. at 38 (stating that every federal and state court that has considered the issue has
concluded that marriage does not include same-sex relations); see also Adams v. Howerton, 486
F. Supp. 1119, 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that marriage necessarily involves contract,
status and relationship between persons of different sexes); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 313-17 (D.C. 1995) (finding that gender-based terminology in statute reflects legisla-
tive understanding that marriage is inherently a male-female relationship);Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (holding that same-sex couple cannot be married because of
their incapability of entering into marriage relationship as term is defined); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 & n.1 (Minn. 1971) (holding that Minnesota does not allow marriage
between persons of same sex and that such marriages are prohibited); Frances B. v. Mark B.,
355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Kings Co. Sup. Ct. 1974) (noting that marriage has always been a con-
tract between man and woman); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Queens
Co. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that marriage ceremony between male and other male who had
undergone surgery to become female did not create marriage contract); Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at
798-99 (finding that terms "marriage" and "spouse" necessarily and exclusively involve contract
between persons of different sexes); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (noting long-time assumption and common usage of marriage as being between man
and woman, thus prohibiting same-sex marriage); Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex.
App. 1982) (holding that, in Texas, it is not possible for marriage to exist between persons of
same sex); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that
legislature has not authorized same-sex marriages).
87. See Candace L. Sage, Note, Sister-State Recognition of Valid Same-Sex Marriages: Baehr v.
Lewin-How Will It Play in Peoria?, 28 IND. L. REv. 115, 129 (1994) (stating that existence of
sodomy laws may indicate forum's public policy against same-sex marriage).
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forum has a similar public policy against same-sex marriages.' Al-
though the existence of sodomy laws alone may not be sufficient to
ascertain whether a strong public policy exists,s examination of the
forum's statutes, legislative history and express provisions, caselaw,
and the history and traditions of the forum and society generally
could provide a forum's court with ample evidence that the forum
has a strong public policy against same-sex marriage." Given indica-
tions of such a strong public policy, courts quite reasonably could in-
voke the public policy exception and refuse to validate same-sex mar-
riages.
3. Characterization
Another common way that a court may escape the rigidity of the
general rule of validation is through characterization of the case."'
How the court decides to characterize a case could be considered
outcome-determinative; for the purposes of conflict of laws analysis,
certain characterizations often lead to the use of one forum's laws,
while alternative characterizations may lead to use of another state's
laws.
An example of how characterization of a claim can effect the out-
come of a cause of action is illustrated by the following scenario: a
passenger buys a train ticket in state A for a train ride from state A to
state B, and the passenger is injured when the train is involved in an
accident in state B. Assume that tort law in state A favors the passen-
ger and state B's tort law favors the train company. Assume also that
state A's contract law favors the passenger and state B's contract law
favors the train company. If the resulting suit were characterized as a
tort, the outcome of the suit would be governed by the law of the
place of the wrong93 (state B), and the train company wins. If, how-
88. See id.
89. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing cases where courts upheld
out-of-state marriages that violated forum state statute becuase statute did not impart clear in-
tent, and out-of-state marriages did not violate a strong public policy of the forum).
90. Because no two forum states share the same caselaw, statutes, history and traditions,
each forum will need to determine individually whether the recognition of same-sex marriages
performed in other states violates a strong public policy of the forum.
91. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 43 (noting that problem of categorization of cases,
known as characterization, presents particularly difficult questions when cases address a conflict
of laws issue because such cases already involve at least two different bodies of law, each of
which may use same concepts to mean different things). This problem is exacerbated by con-
flict of laws rules, which are few in number and thus, very broad. See id. at 43-48 (reviewing
relevant caselaw impacted by characterization of issue).
92. See id. at 43 (illustrating that different characterizations often give rise to different out-
comes).
93. Both Restatements treat tort cases similarly. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 52,
§ 377 (stating that tort cases are governed by lex loci delicti (the law of the place of wrong)), with
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ever, the very same case were characterized as a contract for safe pas-
sage, the governing law would be the law of the place of making the
contrace4 (state A), and the passenger would win. From this simplis-
tic example, it becomes clear that the outcome of conflict of laws
cases may be affected by the way the cases are characterized.
This scenario suggests that state courts hearing same-sex marriage
cases could similarly alter the outcome of cases by characterizing
them in different ways. For example, marriage cases otherwise gov-
erned by the law of the state of celebration 5 could be designated by a
court to be a domestic status case, under which circumstances that
court could more readily apply the law of its own forum." By charac-
terizing these cases in such a way, the forum could apply its own laws
to the cause of action, which would lead to dismissal of same-sex mar-
riage recognition cases in forum states where same-sex marriage is
not authorized.
Similarly, if the parties seeking to have their marriage recognized
were domiciled in the forum at the time of the marriage and went to
another state to get married, the forum could apply its law by charac-
terizing the cause of action seeking validation of a same-sex marriage
as a case involving the parties' capacity to bring suit.97 A party's ca-
pacity to bring suit on a cause of action is governed by the laws of the
party's domicile if the courts consider it a procedural issue.98 Thus,
by characterizing such a case as procedural, the forum would apply
its laws instead of the laws of the state of celebration, thus ensuring
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 145 (stating that tort cases are to be governed by law
of state with most significant relationship to the issue, and that contracts used to determine
place of most significant relationship include, among others, place where injury occurred).
94. Under both Restatements, contract cases are generally governed by the law of the fo-
rum in which the contract was made. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 332 (stating that
contract validity is governed by lex loci contractionis (the law of the place of making)), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, §§ 186-188 (stating generally that contract issues are to
be governed first by any choice of law provisions in contract, but if there are none, they are to
be governed by the state with the most significant relationship to contract). The various factors
to be considered in determining place of most significant relationship include place of con-
tracting, place of negotiations and place of performance, among others. See id. Note also that
when determining the place of most significant relationship under Restatement (Second), the sec-
tion 6 factors are also taken into account. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (listing § 6
factors).
95. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (examining traditional choice of law rule).
96. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 54(2) ("A state has jurisdiction over the domestic
status of persons domiciled within the state."). Comment c clarifies that"[d]omestic status is
the status of husband and wife. ... " Id. § 54(2) cmt. c.
97. See Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 815-16 (Wis. 1959) (holding
that issue was not one of tort but one of capacity to bring suit, and that such capacity is more
properly determined by reference to law of state of domicile); CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 2, at
50-58.
98. See CRAMPTON ETAL., supra note 2, at 50-58.
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that the forum would not be bound by the same-sex marriage recog-
nition statutes or cases of another state.
B. Most Significant Relationship Approach
While the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws gives a pre-
sumption of validity to marriages celebrated outside the forum state,"
as discussed above, its "most significant relationship" test is a more
flexible approach,'00 allowing factors beyond the place of celebration
of the marriage to be considered in determining the place of the
most significant relationship.'O
Under the most significant relationship approach, a forum state
would have a strong argument that it had a much more significant
relationship to the family and the spouses than a foreign state does.
0 2
The forum state automatically has an interest because the parties are
availing themselves of the resources of the forum's court, and are at-
tempting to effect the definition of marriage in the forum.
This argument would be particularly persuasive if the spouses were
domiciliaries of the forum at the time of their marriage and simply
went to Hawaii to take advantage of that state's marriage statutes, or
if the couple later moved from Hawaii to become domiciliaries of the
forum.'"° In such instances, Hawaii would have limited interest in the
status of the couple's marriage, particularly when a couple never lives
in Hawaii, and simply returns to their home state after the marriage
is performed.
C. Interest Analysis and the "False Conflict"
Some states reject both Restatements' approaches to conflict of
laws and instead use Governmental Interest Analysis to determine
which state's law should apply to a cause of action. One unique as-
pect of Governmental Interest Analysis is the weeding out of "false
99. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the general rule that, barring ex-
ceptions, a marriage valid in the place of its celebration will be valid everywhere).
100. SeThomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments
for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 513-14 (1995) (stating that Second
Restatement's most significant relationship approach is more flexible than traditional lex lo
celjbrationis, and that Restatement (Second) § 6 considers invalidation under more general public
policy exception); Sondrea joy King, Note & Comment, Y'all Cain't Do That Here: Will Texas
Recognize Same-Sex Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States ? 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 515, 533-
34 (1996) (citing case in which Texas court cited /ex loci celebrationisas too formalistic and me-
chanical, opting to use most significant relationship approach).
101. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing most significant relationship ap-
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conflicts."'' 4 A false conflict arises when both parties to a cause of ac-
tion are residents of the same state.'05 Because both parties are from
the same state, false conflict cases do not involve conflicting interests
of the separate states. Thus, the forum is justified in using its own law
if both parties are from the forum, under which circumstances it
would apply its laws to the cause of action and would then determine
if its laws permitted same-sex marriage. These cases would be treated
like any other domestic forum case involving same-sex marriage.'0
6
True conflicts arise where one party is from one state and the
other party is from another. In such cases, Governmental Interest
Analysis typically applies the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws.'0 7 Thus, Governmental Interest Analysis differs from the Sec-
ond Restatement only in that it allows states to weed out the false
conflicts by applying the forum's laws if both parties are from the fo-
108
rum.
The case of a same-sex couple seeking to have their out-of-state
marriage recognized by a forum state represents a false conflict. The
parties would seek to have their marriage validated either because
they were residents of another state that allows same-sex marriage
and they then moved to the forum, or because they are residents of
the forum and went to another state to be married. Under either
scenario, both parties would be from the forum at the time suit was
filed; thus the forum would be justified in applying its law to the
cause of action.
CONCLUSION
If Hawaiians do not ratify the constitutional amendment in No-
vember, and if the Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately determines that
its state constitution gives same-sex couples the right to marry, states
will not be forced to recognize same-sex marriages performed in Ha-
waii.
104. See generally CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 147 (explaining that "false conflicts" are
those in which both parties come from same state); Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts:
A Study In Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 232 (1958) (eliminating purely do-
mestic case from typology of conflict of laws cases).
105. See supra text accompanying note 24; cf. Note, supra note 4, at 2041 (rejecting Currie's
false conflict approach to allowing forum to apply its law); Keane, supra note 100, at 510
(discussing false conflicts and Currie's method of forum selection).
106. See Keane, supra note 100, at 510 (discussing false conflicts and Currie's method of fo-
rum selection). But see Note, supra note 4, at 2041 (rejecting Currie's false conflict approach to
allowing forum to apply its law).
107. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 148-50 (discussing conflict of law rules for true
conflicts under Currie's Interest Analysis and Governmental Interest Analysis).
108. See id.
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The Defense of Marriage Act has redefined the effect that a state's
judgment or law permitting same-sex marriage will have on other
states. This Act preserves federalism in the regulation of marriage by
ensuring that no state will be forced to recognize such marriages;
marriage has traditionally been defined by the individual states and
should continue to be so regulated.
States may look to conflict of laws rules to determine the effect of
another state's same-sex marriages. Although commentators have
overwhelmingly posited that conflict of laws rules will force other
states to recognize these marriages, the preceding review of the es-
cape devices and exceptions to these rules clearly shows that states
are free to invalidate same-sex marriages within their borders. In ad-
dition, many states have enacted or are seeking to enact a new breed
of marriage evasion statutes that reject out-of-state same-sex mar-
riages. In short, Hawaii's acceptance of same-sex marriage, if it oc-
curs, will not necessarily bring such marriages to a state near you.

